Edward, Weitz, and Wartenberg

Well I think many of the problems faced in this discussion are due to what I would consider a misplaced emphasis on sight. Wartenberg mentioned, and I think you have taken the therm aesthetic to mean visual, and therein lies a problem. Aesthetic, I think, applies to more than that which is seen, but that which is perceived.

Edward: "1) Is "Tree Logic" art? Why?"

Yes it is. You mention that it lacks any aesthetic merit, and I would agree with you, but it is obviously aesthetic as you can perceive the trees, yes, even see them. Let us make sure that we are not conflating a lack of aesthetic merit with a lack of aesthetics on a whole. If the trees lack aesthetic merit, then perhaps they are bad art, but they are art nonetheless.
Given this, I do not think it gives more credence to Weitz's claim that we cannot define art. I think it is definable, and that definition is objective.

Edward: "2) Might it be possible to coin a definition of art that has the necessary and sufficient conditions to allow such diverse pieces as, say, "The Mona Lisa," Beethoven's symphonies, and "Tree Logic" to all fall in to the category of art?"

Yes, I think it is absolutely possible. I also believe that the only necessary, and yes sufficient, conditions for something to be art is that it must have been created by the artist (sorry Duchamp), and it must have been created with an artistic intent. The Mona Lisa, Beethoven's symphonies, and Tree Logic, all seem to satisfy these conditions (Yes, I know that there is no way to know for sure, but it is a reasonable assumption).


Question: Is signing an object, say a urinal, enough of a creation to label something as art?

Absurd Discussion

During class today, while we were speaking of transcultural art and whether it exists, I was struck with an idea that stayed with me. Why is this not an absurd conversation? How are we to determine if another culture's art is the same concept of our own when we do not have a concrete idea of what our own actually is? How can this conversation continue without first defining art, at least the western concept thereof. To determine if A is the same as B, should you not first know what A is?

Me: "Hey, Gerald, do you have the same car as I do?"
Gerald: "I don't know, what kind of car do you drive?"
Me: "I don't know."

It seems rather ridiculous, no?

I understand that art is difficult to define. That for most people, it has not been done satisfactorily enough. But for the sake of this debate, this discourse, is it not necessary?

My question then: Are we being premature? Are we having a conversation before we should? Should we define our terms before we continue?

Wartenberg Talks of Art

I had the pleasure of attending the free talk that Wartenberg joined us for on Wednesday evening. We, the group, spoke of many topics, but one upon which we lingered for a time was the role of beauty in art, a conversation that continued over dinner after we had left campus. Beauty has had a long and significant history in the realm of aesthetics, from Kant to Danto, though beauty has been a topic long before Kant and will long after Danto.

I think that beauty has been over emphasized, both in a definitive and qualitative manner. I have heard it used to determine whether or not an artifact is art: "That's not art, that's ugly." I have also heard beauty used as a criteria for qulaity within art: "This work sucks, it's not beautiful." Both these scenarios do a great disservice to viewer and artist.

What do you think? Where is beauty's proper role in contemplation of the aesthetic?

Response to Edward's Question

Edward: "What factor do you think differentiates 'pornography' and 'erotica?'"

I do not think that there is a significant aesthetic difference between pornography and erotica, though I do believe that there is an important distinction artistically. The difference is not typically perceptually distinguishable (Perhaps Danto could help us then) rather it is one of intent. I think that both pornography and erotica can be meant to arouse, and both of them can have artistic intent as well. The difference I think lies in the importance of these too aspects. Pornography is meant to arouse, and then there is potential for artistic merit. Erotica is the opposite.

Erotica: Artistic intent then arousal
Pornography: Arousal then artistic intent

Yes, this idea is dependent upon Kant being wrong, in that artistic evaluation does not have to be from a disinterested point of view.

Question: On a somewhat unrelated note (though Tania touched upon this) what merit, if any, is there in attaining a definition of art?

Response to Tania and Edward

Tania: "One hears that there is a rise in appreciation of the arts, but is this really true? In our country will it ever be the case that more schools rally harder to keep their art programs or will they always be the first to go?"

Edward: "Is participation in the arts from an early age beneficial to the development of a child

I will answer, or attempt to answer, both of these questions as they are closely related.

Tania, I fear that for the next few years at least, perhaps a decade or more, the latter will be far more likely. For the current generation of teachers and superintendents, the cold war is not yet a distant enough memory. "It was mathematics and science the won the cold war." It is a view that further emphasizes the shortsighted belief that art does not have a practical application. I think, happily ensconced in our Cold War victory, we are not tempted to forge a new path and accept that the arts have their purpose.

Edward, before I begin allow me to clarify that I have had only the most general training in psychology so anything I say will be based heavily upon speculation. That having been said, I do think that there is a benefit to the development of a child to partake in the arts as a child. I do not mean that they must necessarily partake in the generation of art; experiencing art will do just as well.
There has been a definite fall in the funding for arts, in the dissemination of art, especially for our youth. The number of children that are taking ADD or ADHD drugs has tripled (www.ed.gov) from 1990 - 1995 and the number continues to rise. We have pathologized childish behavior when, it seems to me, there are normal explanations. Art, I think, allows for expression, an activity more important for children as they have less developed ways to deal with emotion and turmoil.

Question: Do you think there are positive uses and applications for art, and if so, what will it take for those in authority to also realize this?

Evils of Thanksgiving

Well, I remember that we were told to blog on the evils of Thanksgiving, and so I will. For some reason as I began jotting down notes for this entry, I wrote the first few in a stanza and then just decided to write it as a poem. I jotted this down in a matter of minutes so please excuse such trivial things as meter, rhythm, rhyme, so on...

We have been instructed
And so I shall obey
To speak of the evils
On this Thanksgiving Day

We did partake of flesh,
Lurid tradition's sake:
Consume another life,
Doth a murderer make

But how shall this relate
To a class such as ours?
'Twas Telfer was it not
That lent her mental powers?

She talked of food at length
She spoke of transience
"Food is surely minor,
With no significance"

How can this claim be made?
Much less upon this date.
I stand here opposed,
With death upon my plate.




Question (Absolutely Unrelated): Would an aesthetic difference between erotica and pornography change a moral view of the subject? Would it be more likely that viewing one would be considered more moral than the other? Or should a class on aesthetics not even broach this subject?

Aristotle's View of Tragedy

First off, I am not convinced that tragedy is the foundation for horror. It is convenient to draw that conclusion, for very often tragic events befall characters in horror, but I think there are plenty of distinguishable characteristics. This point is not incredibly relevant to my take on Aristotle's theory however.

It seems unlikely to me that Aristotle's theory would work as an explanation for why people enjoy horror and tragedy. Even if we were to accept that this effect, this desensitizing, takes place by watching tragedy and horror, which I am not convinced of, I would find it surprising if people had this intent when they went to see horror and tragedy. No matter the benefit after the fact, the actual experience of horror and tragedy would not be changed significantly; it would still be unpleasant.

Question: Could desensitization also have a negative effect? Could we bear witness to so much horror and tragedy that it no longer strikes us as odd, as strange, as anything worth stopping?

Response to Edward

Edward Asked: "To end with a (completely unrelated) question: Might video games be considered potential works of art?"

Well, the answer to the actual question being asked, I think, is rather simple. Yes, video games might be considered potential works of art. They have been considered as such; I have considered them as such. Are they legitimate art forms? This question gets to be a little tougher to answer, but I think it remains a resounding yes.

The underlying question here, I think, is much more interesting than that. Where do we distinguish an act as a completely separate art form? Video Games for example: The actual graphics have to be crafted, the music has to be either created or applied, the story has to be written. Is the story writing its own art form? It is significantly different than crafting the graphics, or writing music. Are video games an art form or are they just an assimilation of distinguishable smaller art forms? To underline my point here, Theater consists of three major parts also. Acting, writing the script, and creating the set. Is theater an art form?

So, here is my question: Where is the line? At what point do we distinguish an art form from another, and at which point do we combine two different crafts and call it an art?

Response to Betsy

Betsy:
1. "Does your body suffer from exposure to traumatic fiction?"
2. "Does your body suffer from exposure to traumatic non-fiction"

I will preface this by saying that I do not know the science that would be involved here. Rather I do not know very well the science involved here.

I think that the same answer would be applicable to both questions here and that is: I think that you body CAN suffer from such exposure yes, though perhaps the probability is increased for traumatic non-fiction.

Symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder often affect and PTSD has been known to present even when the subject was himself or herself not even harmed. Witnessing a traumatic event has been known to cause PTSD and therefore bodily damage. Our ability to empathize with fiction, if strong enough, I think, could elicit such a response. This empathy, of course, is stronger and more likely with non-fiction.

Question: Since we can suffer by exposure to certain fictions and non-fiction, can we equally benefit from others?

Constructivist Art

I had the pleasure of attending Professor Johnson's and Professor Silliman's reading from their new book the other day in the Smith House. It was highly entertaining and thought provoking: enjoyable on all accounts. The discussion following was one primarily of the philosophy of Constructivism, one in which knowledge is constructed by humans as opposed to being discovered by them. (My summation surely does not do it justice)

This left me thinking about, amongst many other things, where a constructivist would stand in the realm of aesthetics, a realm highly predominated by subjective thought already. I suppose as this blog goes, the question is the extent of the entry. It would seem to me that constructivism is an epistemology and therefore would not offer an opinion on art one way or the other.

What do you think? Would this theory of epistemology affect a view of aesthetics, of art?

Unmotivating Fear

Walton Writes: "Fear emasculated by subtracting its distinctive motivational force is not fear at all."

This was in rebuttal to the example of fearing a dog even if there is rational reason to believe the dog to be harmless. The person who is afraid of the dog will be motivated to avoid the dog and therefore the situation is different than Charles being afraid of a slime on the movie screen. Charles is not motivated to action, therefore, it cannot be true fear he experiences.

Once again, we are presented with a narrow definition that does nothing but prove correct the one offering the definition.

Temporary paralysis is as common a reaction to fear as it is to flee. Two situations: 1) A man is confronted by a mugger with a knife; he turns and flees. 2) A man in confronted by a mugger with a knife, he is frozen and allows himself to be robbed.

It is presumptuous to claim that the man in situation 1 was afraid but the man in situation 2 was not. Fear does not necessarily move us to action. This is not meant to complete invalidate Walton, just this particular point.

Question: Walton deal almost exclusively with fear. What of admiration? What of pity? What of shame? Remorse? Do all feelings get categorized with fear?

Response to Tania

Before I respond to your question, which I do intend to respond to, I would like to address a point you made in the body of your blog post.

"I think that we have all taken issue with Scruton mainly because there is some internal sense in all of us that photography is art, and given his argument it, which really has no holes in it, photography is not art."

You do a good job illustrating why Edward's objection was invalid, and I do admit that most of my objections when I first read Scruton were wholly due to this presupposition of photography. However, I do believe that there are holes in Scruton's argument, wholes that can be traced back to a single problem. His definition of ideal photography is too narrow. He defines this in a manner that will suit the rest of his following argument. It is the equivalent of crafting your own maze and then solving it.

Your question: Is there any way in which that presentation can somehow turn into a representation? (Since this is what is needed to call something an art form, because representation shows artistic intention)

No, I do not think there is. A presentation is a representation or it is not, there is not way to turn one into the other. I could be unclear as to what you meant by presentation, but it would seem to me that all representations are presentations, though not all presentations are representations.

Question: In relation to Part 7, must we perceive a danger to ourselves in order to truly experience fear?

Response to Tania

Tania asked: "My inquiry has to do with how one would or could consider something like photography collages, and whether his objection would still stand? In the collage pictured the subject is definitely not shown as a mere moment and yet it is still a photography to a certain extent, isn't it?"

I think that Scruton would claim that the photographs taken only show a mere moment, and the true art occurs when the artist gathers the photographs and arranges them in a particular way to show a passing of time. Each photograph only captures a moment, and so Scruton's objection to photography is not defeated by a collage.

Question: What about 'representation' means that it must be something other than a mere moment?

Aesthetics

There being a dearth of student blogging this week, I will respond to Professor Johnson's blog post as to his thoughts on the aesthetic appreciation of nature. He posted, in summary, this:

Aesthetic means "involving the arts." Nature is not art. Therefore we cannot aesthetically appreciate nature. (This is just a summary, his actual argument is posted here.)

The only problem, I think, with this argument is the first premise upon which lies the entirety of the following conclusions. The definition of aesthetic, I think, is too narrow.

My thoughts on aesthetic appreciation of nature:

1. Aesthetics means "That which appertains to perception."
2. An aesthetic response is one's emotional response to the object of their perception.
3. Aesthetic appreciation is a type of aesthetic response.
4. We can perceive nature.
5. Therefore, we can aesthetically appreciate nature.


1. Aesthetics means "That which appertains to perception"
According to the online etymology dictionary, Aesthetic is derived, in 1798, from the German ästhetisch, or from the French esthétique, both from the Greek aisthetikos, meaning "sensitive," which was orignally derived from aisthanesthai meaning "to perceive, or to feel." Nowehere in the development I did not want to merely say 'that which pertains to perception' for that is far too inclusive, but by using appertains, it limits the definition to what ever is a part of perception, or that which is perceived.

2. An aesthetic response is one's emotional response to the object of their perception.
A twitching muscle, in response to a perceived object would not be an aesthetic response, so an aesthetic response must be emotional. You cannot have an emotional response to an object that you did not perceive, so it must be one's ... to the object of their perception.

3. Aesthetic appreciation is a type of aesthetic response.
Appreciation is an emotional response, so aesthetic appreciation is a type of aesthetic response.

4. We can perceive nature.
While an object of nature is not an art object, it is an object.

5. Therefore, we can aesthetically appreciate nature.
If we can perceive nature, than nature appertains to perception, and is therefore aesthetic. We can appreciate aesthetics.



Question: Telfer attributed food as a minor art, and Scruton thinks that photography is a lesser art form. Are there levels of art? Are some forms inherently better than others or is all art, or rather, all artforms equal?

Response To Edward's Response

Edward, I wish to address a few points you made before I move on to answer the actual question you posed.

I asked my question in an effort to distinguish between the metaphysical units of the performance and what is being performed, which would lead me to the claim that a performing art could not actually be immoral, but I believe I was blinded by the end goal and took the wrong route.

This was done following the premise that only actions can be immoral or moral and the assumption that the opposite was also true. But it is not. Although only actions can be moral or immoral, not all actions can be moral or immoral. So I would posit that though they are actions, performing arts can not be immoral themselves though their intentions and effects could be immoral. Yes this is an overly semantic distinction and not one with many practical purposes, but there it is.

Now, you asked: Does the intention behind a work to act as a stimulant for a particular response, i.e. emotional or physical, preclude the possibility that it has aesthetic and artistic merit?

In short, no. The intention of the artist does not retroactively affect the visual aspect of the art so it will naturally have no affect on the aesthetic nature of the work, but does it preclude the artistic merit? I would say that as long as the intention to act as a stimulant for a particular response is not the sole intention behind the work, as long as the "artist" does also intend it to be artistic, than no, I do not think it precludes artistic merit.

Question: Given the subjective nature of taste, is there any merit in discussing the criteria that we use to evaluate how much we appreciate a specific work of art?

Moral or Immoral Art

This is in response to the argument Professor Johnson jotted down during Mr. Yake's discussion on the possibilities of immoral art. The argument was:

1. Only actions, in contrast to mere objects, can be moral/immoral. (Jacob)
2. Art objects, in contrast to mere (perhaps aesthetically pleasing) objects, are always at least artifactual.
3. The artifactuality of art objects makes them, at least in part, performances. (Dutton)
4. Performances are actions.
5.Therefore, art objects can be moral/immoral.

I will naturally not take issue with premise 1, for it was my point...rather, I will not take issue with any point here except #3. It is sound logic to claim that, given the artifactuality, all art is, in some way, inexorably tied to a performance, for action must have been taken for that art to exist. However, despite Dutton, while the action was required for that art to exist, the action is not a part of the art.
To go fishing, you must gather rods, tackle, bait and travel to some source of water, but you are not fishing until you actually cast your line into the water. That may have been a bad example as fishing is also an action, so take, for instance, a book. The pages must have been cut from somewhere. The pages must have been printed upon. The pages must have been bound into an outer layer. All these actions are necessary, but the book itself in autonomous. It is self sustainable as an object and object only. The preceding actions are not part of the book.

In this way, art cannot be immoral, for only actions can be immoral.

Question: Given this argument above, is there a way to distinguish a performing art from the performance? Can a dance exist independent of being danced?

Edward: To end with a question: Is there any link between music and morality, as Scruton suggested in "The Decline of Musical Culture?"

I will begin by noting that I think you have a knack for asking questions that are extremely hard, bordering on impossible, to answer. Is there a link between music and morality? Sure there is. Morality exists and music exists, so if nothing else, there is a link of correlation.

Is this correlation a causation? This is a tougher question. While I am in no position to deny that music could be the cause of morality for certain people, to make a claim of causation between music and morality seems to be rather presumptuous. I do not think that there is enough evidence to support such a claim. Scruton seemed rather sensational and artistic himself in his claims of classical music, so perhaps he did not mean this literally, but if he did, I would merely question how he arrived at such a conclusion, a question that his article, I think, fails to address.

Question: Intent is commonly a requirement for an object to be art, so my only objection to non-human art is that they do not produce art intentionally. While non-humans are capable of producing aesthetic objects, can they have an artistic intent?

Barry: "Do we, in fact, detract from the aesthetic experience of art when talk about it, examine it, justify it and attribute it?"

Well, to begin, I think your question is extremely difficult bordering on impossible to know, for we can never go back in time and evaluate our experience before we talked, examined, justified it. Regardless, I think the question appropriate and prudent.

Mark Twain once said: “We have not the reverent feeling for the rainbow that a savage has, because we know how it is made. We have lost as much as we gained by prying into that matter." It is an interesting sentiment. I think it happens to be true. I find that I am less awed by the magician whose tricks I fully understand. This is a point that I bring to every literature teacher I have ever had, and this is the very point that is haphazardly dismissed by every literature teacher I have ever had.

So yes, Barry, I do think that our analysis of art detracts from our aesthetic experience, but I am not sure if this means we ought to not analyze it anyway. Perhaps we do a disservice to the artist if we do not.

Question: To what purpose, if any, does the quintessential art critic serve?

Fetishism of Artistic Labor

Edward Manak: "SHOULD the artist of a work affect our aesthetic judgment of a piece? Why or why not?"

Well, there are subtleties here that I think your question is amiss at addressing.

No, the artist of a work should not affect our aesthetic judgment of a piece, but let us not forget that I think there is a significant and important distinction here between aesthetics and art. It is all too common that we experience an aesthetic response to say a sunset or a birds nest. . .etc. . . and yet these things are not necessarily art. Our aesthetic response should not be affected. I'll go further. Our aesthetic response IS not affected by the artist.

Now, should the artist affect how we view the object as an object of art? Yes and No. Yes, I think that the fact that the object was created by an artist and was not a haphazard coincidence, is important and should affect how we view the work of art. It is natural for this to occur. Intellectually speaking, how we view a work of art is always going to change dependent upon our information. In this regard Dutton was right. To view art as art and not merely as an aesthetic object, the fact that it was created by an artist is important. The specific artist in question, however, should not affect how we value the work. The effectiveness, the overall quality of the piece should not, as it was in VanMeegeren's case, be influenced by the plaque beneath the painting.

Dutton made more sense as time wore on in the last class, and I think the most important aspect to take from that was the difference between aesthetics and art.

Question: Should we view an aesthetic object as an art piece? Or, perhaps, does taking into account all the necessary information of an artwork detract from our aesthetic response?

Censorship

"Should any art be censored?"

Well, Manak, I think that this issue will rest upon what you mean by censored. Should any particular piece of art be removed from display at all times, all across the board? Or should art be censored to some audiences and not others?

I think it would be fair to say that no piece of art should be universally censored, available to no person at no time. Now, I am not saying that we ought to restrict viewers by race, gender, or even age. I am not a psychologist, though I have heard the arguments, I do not know whether or not there is a physical or psychiatric ill to children viewing things like violence or porn. I am saying however, that even just viewing such material could be considered immoral to people and we need respect that. Perhaps just a notice of material content beforehand so the viewer can make their own decision.

Would this be considered censorship? I do not know, but I am not ready to denounce censorship absolutely.

Question: What role, if any do you think beauty has in our judgment of art? Not whether or not something is art, as I have asked prior, but whether or not art is good. Is it a necessary component or does it not play a role at all?

Ethics and Art

What role does ethics have in art? Should it?

The question of Forgery has brought up many questions concerning the ethics of such an act, and I think that we often have trouble separating the ethics from the aesthetics.

I think that our ethical consideration overshadows and undermines our aesthetic response to a painting. The Disciples of Emmaus is a wonderful painting, and I do not think that the painter, being of questionable morality, should detract from that. The aesthetic qualities of a painting should be judged for what they are; they should not be influenced by the person who painted it.

My question is how do you think ethics influence other mediums of art. What about pornography?

The Essence of Art

Edward Manak asked; "What distinguishes art from everything else in existence? What makes art, art?"

Well, I would hate to merely reiterate the characteristics that I have developed for art, so I will answer the question in a different way. That is, I think your question rests upon a faulty premise or assumption. Does something distinguish art from everything else in existence?

I surely do think that there is a difference between art and everything else, but often times it is not distinguishable. Distinguishable, I believe, denotes a perceptible difference, and in that case means that often enough, a work of art will not distinguish itself from anything else. This is especially prudent in the world of modern art, whether it's Duchamp's "Fountain" or some other aesthetic misplacement.

If you did mean to ask what characteristics separate, objectively, art from everything else, than I suppose that the only one I can think of is intention. The ball placed upon the table was either done with artistic intent or absentmindedness. The only difference between the ball that is art and the ball that is not art is the intent.

Does the label of art affect your aesthetic response? Or is your aesthetic response the same whether or not you consider it art?

Value of Authentic Performances

"What value, if any, is there in an "authentic" musical performance, or is it merely a matter of differing tastes?" This question was posed by Edward Manak, and though I have already responded to a question this week, my idea for a blog came so close to this idea that I figured I would answer his instead.

First of all, there are many subjects upon which I can speak with confidence and competence; music is not one of them. This having been established, I shall continue.

I do not think that the authenticity of a musical performance is, at all, a matter of taste. Authenticity, at least according to Davies, is judged based upon how faithful the performers are to the composer's expressed instructions. In this, I agree with Davies, for I can see no other way to judge authenticity, of a musical performance that is.

Well, actually, I suppose I missed the point of the question. While taste plays no role in judging the authenticity of a performance, the value of an authentic performance would be a matter of taste. Personally, I would not enjoy a musical performance more knowing that it is purely authentic. My aesthetic reaction to a piece of music, or to a performance for that matter, is not impacted at all by the authenticity of that piece.

So I suppose, in my opinion, there is no value in an authentic performance.


And now for something completely different: I often feel the need to reiterate the distinction between art and beauty. I feel that we often get caught up in the moment and are too eager to ascribe the status of art to anything we find beautiful. Can not something be beautiful without being art? Or am I not right to make this distinction?

The Art of Philosophy

A Response to Betsy's question: "Is philosophy an art?"

Because of the subjective nature of the question, I shall address it subjectively. As is often the case, before we determine whether or not a given thing fits into a certain set of qualities, we must first determine what these qualities are, therefore we must determine what qualities constitute art. We must first define art. Now, I do understand the intrinsic difficulties here, so while I do believe it is an apt definition, it is indeed, my definition.

Art = Creation + Intention. Art is anything that was created by man with artistic intent. Now, I understand your immediate objections, for many have made them. I cannot address them all here, nor will I try. I did write a lengthy (10-12 pages) dialogue last year in which I believe I adequately address them and defend this definition, and I would be happy to e-mail this to anyone who asks.

Philosophy, despite its imminent practicality and great interest to me, is, albeit a creation of man, rarely undertaken in an artistic intent. If a philosopher were to write a philosophical dialogue, were to give a speech of a philosophical nature, than both the dialogue and the speech would have the potential to be art, yes, but the philosophy itself would not. Likewise, if two persons were to enter into a discourse, it is their speech, their diction that would likely to be art, but the philosophy that may or may not be within that discourse would not be art, just as the moral within Moby Dick is not art, but the novel itself is.

In short, no, I do not think that philosophy would be considered art. As the definition of art is oh so elusive and equally subjective, here is my question: How do you define art?

Classification and Evaluation

In response to Edward's question; "In the section 'works of art,' Telfer describes the two different ways in which the term 'works of art' is commonly used, specifically, as a classifying or evaluative term. Should the term be used in both senses or should we use on sense over the other exclusively?"

It would appear to me that, all too regularly, patrons of aesthetics confuse the evaluative and classifying sense of the term 'work of art.' Especially in the last class, Art and Philosophy, many of the philosophers would, in my opinion, disregard an art form, not based on some evaluative and logical lack of attributes, but rather from a personal dislike of the particular form.

To answer the question, I do think that we need to look at a work of art in both a evaluative and classifying function; however, it would appear prudent to me to not use the classifying sense in an effort to determine the legitimacy of a certain piece. The classifying manner in which we all experience art is of merit and deserves its own discourse, but only in the application of taste. There is a place for evaluation, and there is a place for classification; I would just have us not confuse the two.

On a completely unrelated note, Korsmeyer says that food is surely not a fine art for it does not have the correct history. Did not all fine arts begin at some point? What history is Korsmeyer suggesting that food ought to have to deserve the additional label of 'fine?'

Thoughts on Telfer

Professor Johnson provided today an adequate explanation as to why Telfer seemed to disregard the visual and structural aspects of food. Telfer was not concerned with how well food would work as a medium for other art forms, rather how food would do as its own form. The only aspect of food that is unique to food and no other form of art is the necessity of taste to experience it.

...and...

Edward Manak, in response to my story about my grandfather's scotch, proposed the idea that art has no intrinsic meaning to it, the meaning is imposed upon it by the person experiencing that particular piece. After some thought, I have concluded that this is a perfectly valid observation, and an extremely sympathetic reading of Telfer's severely presumptuous claim. I would have no issue with Telfer had she phrased it as such, but she did not. While she would be right in the claim that food has no inherent meaning, she claims this as evidence of food's unimportance, implying therefore that the more important arts such as painting, music, and sculpture, do have innate meaning. This, I take issue with. Either all arts have meaning of their own or none of them do...Music possesses no unique attribute, that food lacks, to imbue it with natural meaning.

Telfer made many thoughtful and logically sound arguments in favor of cookery as a form of art in its own right and I can appreciate such. Her arguments begin to deteriorate as she pursues the additional labels of simple and minor.

In class, the people who contributed the most seemed to come to a consensus that Telfer was wrong and cookery is a major art form, but what do you think? I am interested in hearing whether you think food is minor, major, or not an art form at all.

A Bit of Business

I would like to first state that this is not my first official blog entry and this particular blog should not be graded, but I feel as if it should be said nonetheless.

I feel as if in any classroom, and especially a room devoted to discussion, that there needs to be a cohesive system that determines who is to speak and when they are to speak. I understand that such a suggestion reeks of lower level compulsory schools, but raising your hand and waiting to be called upon is not only the polite and civil behavior but also the practical obligation of anyone seeking an environment conducive to a substantial and meaningful discussion.
There were numerous times today that I had something to say, both relevant and positive in its contribution but did not get the chance due to other students talking as soon as there was a pause long enough for my hand to be noticed.

I do not wish to cause any trouble, to be disagreeable, or overly argumentative...I only ask for the same amount of respect that I go out of my way to show others.