Tuesday, October 20, 2009

Moral or Immoral Art

This is in response to the argument Professor Johnson jotted down during Mr. Yake's discussion on the possibilities of immoral art. The argument was:

1. Only actions, in contrast to mere objects, can be moral/immoral. (Jacob)
2. Art objects, in contrast to mere (perhaps aesthetically pleasing) objects, are always at least artifactual.
3. The artifactuality of art objects makes them, at least in part, performances. (Dutton)
4. Performances are actions.
5.Therefore, art objects can be moral/immoral.

I will naturally not take issue with premise 1, for it was my point...rather, I will not take issue with any point here except #3. It is sound logic to claim that, given the artifactuality, all art is, in some way, inexorably tied to a performance, for action must have been taken for that art to exist. However, despite Dutton, while the action was required for that art to exist, the action is not a part of the art.
To go fishing, you must gather rods, tackle, bait and travel to some source of water, but you are not fishing until you actually cast your line into the water. That may have been a bad example as fishing is also an action, so take, for instance, a book. The pages must have been cut from somewhere. The pages must have been printed upon. The pages must have been bound into an outer layer. All these actions are necessary, but the book itself in autonomous. It is self sustainable as an object and object only. The preceding actions are not part of the book.

In this way, art cannot be immoral, for only actions can be immoral.

Question: Given this argument above, is there a way to distinguish a performing art from the performance? Can a dance exist independent of being danced?

3 comments:

  1. I think you're right to focus on premise #3 as the troublesome one.

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  2. The moral judgment would be with the performer, not the performance.

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  3. I have responded to your questions.

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