Response To Edward's Response

Edward, I wish to address a few points you made before I move on to answer the actual question you posed.

I asked my question in an effort to distinguish between the metaphysical units of the performance and what is being performed, which would lead me to the claim that a performing art could not actually be immoral, but I believe I was blinded by the end goal and took the wrong route.

This was done following the premise that only actions can be immoral or moral and the assumption that the opposite was also true. But it is not. Although only actions can be moral or immoral, not all actions can be moral or immoral. So I would posit that though they are actions, performing arts can not be immoral themselves though their intentions and effects could be immoral. Yes this is an overly semantic distinction and not one with many practical purposes, but there it is.

Now, you asked: Does the intention behind a work to act as a stimulant for a particular response, i.e. emotional or physical, preclude the possibility that it has aesthetic and artistic merit?

In short, no. The intention of the artist does not retroactively affect the visual aspect of the art so it will naturally have no affect on the aesthetic nature of the work, but does it preclude the artistic merit? I would say that as long as the intention to act as a stimulant for a particular response is not the sole intention behind the work, as long as the "artist" does also intend it to be artistic, than no, I do not think it precludes artistic merit.

Question: Given the subjective nature of taste, is there any merit in discussing the criteria that we use to evaluate how much we appreciate a specific work of art?